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1. Introduction 
The ‘realist turn’ in the philosophy of science occurred in the 1970s and marked a 
shift from empiricist views concerning scientific theories and their relation to the 
world to realist ones. It was associated with what came to be known as the 
explanationist defense of realism, viz., the strategy of showing that the basic realist 
tenets offer the best explanation of the empirical and predictive successes of scientific 
theories. It was motivated by a move from verification and issues in semantics (how 
do theoretical terms get their meaning?) to abduction (aka inference to the best 
explanation) and issues in epistemology (do we have reasons to take scientific 
theories, literally understood, as truthlike?). Realism initiated an era of epistemic 
optimism: science is in the truth-business. Soon enough however, this optimistic 
stance was challenged by rival views which aimed to show that, even after the 
collapse of instrumentalism, realism is not the only game in town concerning science 
(this was the key objective of van Fraassen’s (1980) constructive empiricism); or that 
realism is at odds with the history of science and, in particular, with a track record of 
false and abandoned, but otherwise empirically successful, theories (this was Mary 
Hesse’s and Larry Laudan’s historical induction). In reply to the historical challenge, 
realists became more selective in what they are realists about.  
 This chapter offers a narrative of the basic twists and turns of the realism debate 
after the realist turn. I will start with what preceded and initiated the turn, viz., 
instrumentalist construals of scientific theories. I will then move on to discuss the 
basic lines of development of the realist stance to science, focusing on one of its main 
challenges: the historical challenge.  
 
2. Semantic realism 
The current phase of the scientific realism debate—what I call the epistemic phase—
started in the middle 1960s and was based on an important consensus, viz., semantic 
realism. This is the view that the vocabulary of scientific theories should be treated in 
a uniform way on the basis of standard referential semantics. In the early 1950s, the 
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dominant empiricist view was that theories are only partially interpreted, meaning 
that they are divided into two parts, one theoretical and one observational, such that 
only their observational part (expressed by means of a theory-free observational 
vocabulary) is fully interpreted, while the theoretical part is only partially meaningful 
on the basis of its deductive relations to the observational part. Being only partially 
interpreted, theoretical terms were not taken to be putatively referring to anything in 
the world and concomitant theoretical assertions were not taken to have truth-
conditions. At best, t-terms and t-assertions (that is, the core of theories qua theories) 
were taken to be ways to systematize deductively a set of observational assertions, 
which could be independently testable by means of direct observations.1 
 This empiricist approach to the semantics of theories started to crumble when 
Herbert Feigl (1950) argued that in thinking about the content of theories, we should 
separate the issue of what makes a theory true (if it is true) and the issue of the 
evidence for its truth. A scientific theory can then have truth-conditions which make 
an essential reference to unobservable entities and their properties and relations even 
if the evidence for these truth-conditions is, by and large, observational. What 
empiricists had come to call the ‘excess content’ of theoretical discourse is captured 
by the fact that t-discourse is about unobservable entities. 
 If semantic realism is taken for granted, it seems that the question of realism takes 
care of itself. Theories cannot be proved to be true; nonetheless, they can be confirmed 
by empirical evidence (as both realists and empiricists agree). Given semantic realism, if 
scientific theories are well-confirmed, there are reasons to believe in the reality of the 
theoretical entities they posit. To hold a theory as well-confirmed is to accept that the 
entities posited by the theory are part of the furniture of the world. This kind of view 
was captured very eloquently by Wilfrid Sellars when he said (1963: 97):  
 
To have a good reason for holding a theory is ipso facto to have good reasons for holding that 
the entities postulated by the theory exist. 
 
3. For instrumentalism 
But in the middle 1950s an argument became available to the effect that t-terms are 
dispensable. If this were true, semantic realism would become irrelevant. The very 																																																								1	Earlier	empiricist	approaches	understood	the	truth-conditions	of	theoretical	assertions	reductively,	but	this	is	a	different	story.	For	a	detailed	discussion,	see	my	(1999,	chapter	1).	
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idea that theories purport to describe the world as it is in its unobservable parts—a 
central realist intuition about science—would become a non-starter. The argument 
was based on a theorem proved by logician William Craig, the philosophical 
application of which led to the statement that came to be known as Craig’s Theorem: 
for any scientific theory T, T is replaceable by another (axiomatisable) theory 
Craig(T), consisting of all and only the theorems of T which are formulated in terms 
of the observational vocabulary VO (Craig 1956). The gist of Craig’s theorem is that a 
theory is a conservative extension of the deductive systematization of its 
observational consequences. This theorem was taken to capture the canonical form of 
instrumentalism.  
Though it’s hard to find philosophers who explicitly characterized themselves as 
instrumentalists,2 Graig’s theorem offered a boost to instrumentalism—the view that 
theories should be seen as (useful) instruments for the organization, classification and 
prediction of observable phenomena; hence that the ‘cash value’ of scientific theories 
is fully captured by what theories say about the observable world. Craig’s theorem 
was taken to show that the whole body of theoretical commitments in science—those 
expressed by the theoretical vocabulary—were dispensable, since theoretical terms 
could be eliminated en bloc, without loss in the deductive connections among the 
observable consequences of the theory.  
 At roughly the same time, Carnap (1958) re-invented the so-called Ramsey-
sentence. The idea goes back to Frank Ramsey (1929): the content of a theory is 
captured by a single existential statement, in which the theoretical predicates are 
replaced by bound (second-order existential) quantifiers. The Ramsey-sentence RT 
that replaces theory T has exactly the same observational consequences as T; it can 
play the same role as T in reasoning; it is truth-evaluable if there are entities that 
satisfy it; but since it dispenses altogether with theoretical vocabulary and refers to 
whatever entities satisfy it only by means of quantifiers, it was taken to remove the 
issue of the reference of theoretical terms/predicates. Hence, it was taken to present a 
neutral ground between realism and instrumentalism. Carnap enthusiastically jumped 
on this idea since he thought he could deflate the debate between realism and 																																																								2	A	notable	exception	is	Philipp	Frank	(1932),	whose	instrumentalism,	in	modern	terminology,	is	a	form	of	non-cognitivism:	theories	are	symbolic	tools	that	do	not	(aim	to)	represent	anything	which	is	not	antecedently	given	in	experience.		
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instrumentalism as being merely about a choice of language. At the same time, he 
thought he could secure the proper empirical content of theories against commitment 
to physical unobservable entities. What is more, as Carnap was first to note, the very 
theory T can be written down as a conjunction of two parts: the Ramsey-sentence RT 
of T and the conditional RTàT, which came to known as Carnap-sentence and was 
taken to be a meaning postulate with no empirical content.  
 By the end of the 1950s, then, the semantic realist project seemed to be short-lived. 
The realist conception of theories had to sail between the Scylla of Craig’s theorem 
and the Charybdis of Ramsey-sentences. The argument that theoretical discourse 
possesses excess content over observational discourse and it is putatively referential 
came under severe pressure since by either Craig’s theorem or Ramsey-sentences, 
theoretical vocabulary was rendered dispensable without loss of (empirical) content. 
Carl Hempel (1958) expressed this pessimist sentiment in the form of ‘the 
theoretician’s dilemma’. If the theoretical terms and principles of a theory do not 
serve their purpose of a deductive systematization of the empirical consequences of 
the theory, they are dispensable. But, given Craig’s theorem (and Ramsey-sentences), 
even if they do serve their purpose, they can be dispensed with. Hence, the theoretical 
terms and principles of any theory are dispensable.  
 
4. Negative and positive arguments for realism 
An otherwise plausible defense of semantic realism (via meaning holism and the 
denial of the distinction between theory-based and observation-based vocabulary) was 
turning against an(other) important realist intuition: viz., that subsequent theories, as a 
rule, do better than their predecessors in representing the world. This is the context in 
which the first thorough defense of realism takes place in the work of Hilary Putnam. 
 
4.1 Against instrumentalism 
In his writings in the 1960s, Putnam aimed to motivate and defend realism first by 
arguing systematically against instrumentalist approaches to scientific theories.  
Two of his arguments stick out. The first relates to Craig’s Theorem-based 
instrumentalism. Putnam (1965) mounted a formidable attack on the philosophical 
significance of Craig’s theorem arguing that a) theoretical terms are meaningful, 
taking their meaning from the theories in which they feature and b) scientists employ 
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terms like ‘electron’, ‘virus’, ‘spacetime curvature’ and so on—and advance relevant 
theories—because they wish to talk about electrons, viruses, the curvature of 
spacetime and so on; that is scientists want to find out about the unobservable world. 
Theoretical terms provide scientists with the necessary linguistic tools for talking 
about things they want to talk about.  
 Putnam’s second argument relates to the role of theories in the confirmation of 
observational statements. The idea is that theories are often necessary for the 
establishment of inductive connections between seemingly unrelated observational 
statements. Here is Putnam’s (1963) own example. Consider the prediction H: ‘When 
two subcritical masses of U235 are slammed together to form a supercritical mass, there 
will be a nuclear explosion’. H could be re-written in an observational language—that 
is without the t-term ‘Uranium235’—as O1: ‘When two particular rocks are slammed 
together, an explosion will happen’. Consider now the available evidence, namely O2: 
‘Up to now, when two rocks were put together nothing happened’. Given this, it 
follows that prob(O1/O2) is very low, (if it can be determined at all). But consider the 
posterior probability of O1 given the past evidence and the atomic theory T which 
entails that the uranium rocks would explode if critical mass were attained quickly 
enough. It is obvious that prob(O1/O2&T) is now determined and is much greater than 
prob(O1/O2). 
To the challenge of semantic holism and the implication of radical reference-
variance, Putnam replied by developing Saul Kripke’s causal theory of reference. In a 
number of papers in the 1970s (1973; 1974; 1975a), he extended this theory to cover 
the reference of natural-kind terms, physical-magnitude terms and theoretical terms. 
A key consequence of this causal theory is that semantic incommensurability is 
disposed of and the possibility of referential continuity in theory-change is 
safeguarded. If, for instance, the referent of the term ‘electricity’ is fixed causally, all 
different theories of electricity refer to, and dispute over, the same ‘existentially 
given’ magnitude, viz. electricity. The causal theory makes available a way to 
compare theories and to allow claims to the effect that the successor theory is more 
truthlike than its predecessors. Besides, it tallied with Putnam’s considered view that 
the positive defense of realism is, by and large, an empirical (naturalistic) endeavour. 
The way the world is constituted and causally interacts with the language-users is an 
indispensable constraint on the theory and practice of fixing the reference (and 
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meaning) of the language used to talk about the world: the conceptual and linguistic 
categories scientists use to talk about the world are tuned to accommodate the causal 
structure of the world. 
 Given these of arguments, the negative case for scientific realism—viz., that 
instrumentalism fails patently to account for the role, scope and aim of scientific 
theories—was hard to resist.  
 
4.2 For Realism 
Putnam went further by offering a positive argument for scientific realism. In his 
(1975: 73) he penned the most famous argument for scientific realism—which has 
become known as the ‘no miracles argument’ (NMA). Here is the argument in full: 
 
The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that does not make the success 
of science a miracle. That terms in mature scientific theories typically refer (this formulation is due 
to Richard Boyd), that the theories accepted in a mature science are typically approximately true, 
that the same terms can refer to the same even when it occurs in different theories—these 
statements are viewed not as necessary truths but as part of the only scientific explanation of the 
success of science, and hence as part of any adequate description of science and its relations to its 
objects. 
 
There has been heated debate about this argument (see my 1999, chapter 4). For 
now, I want to explain the reference in it to Richard Boyd. In his widely circulated 
and discussed, but (still) unpublished, manuscript Realism and Scientific 
Epistemology, Boyd tied the defense of scientific realism to the best (or “the only 
plausible”) explanation of the fact that scientific methodology has succeeded in 
producing predictively reliable theories.  
Boyd viewed scientific realism as an historical thesis about the “operation of 
scientific methodology and the relation between scientific theories and the world” 
(1971: 12). As such, realism is not a thesis about current science only; it is also a 
thesis about the historical record of science: it claims that there has been convergence 
to a truer image of the world, even though past theories have been known to have 
been mistaken in some respects. This historical dimension is necessary if the truth (or 
partial truth, or significant truth) of scientific theories is to be admitted as the best 
explanation of the predictive reliability of methodology. For unless continuity-in-
theory-change and convergence are established, past failures of scientific theories will 
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act as defeaters of the view that current science is on the right track. If, however, 
realism aims to explain an historical truth—viz., that scientific theories have been 
remarkably successful in the prediction and control of natural phenomena—the 
defense of scientific realism can only be a posteriori and broadly empirical. Boyd 
should in fact be credited with the move that what came to be known as the 
explanationist defense of realism should be conducted within a broadly naturalistic 
framework.  
 
5.The three theses of realism 
In light of the Putnam-Boyd understanding, scientific realism c. 1980 incorporated 
three theses:  
 
a. REFERENCE: Theoretical terms refer to unobservable entities;  
b. TRUTH: Theories are (approximately) true; and  
c. CONTINUITY: There is referential continuity in theory change.  
 
REFERENCE encapsulates semantic realism, and more specifically a certain non-
verificationist reading of scientific theories—what came to be known as a ‘literal or 
face-value understanding’ of theories. But REFERENCE also implies a certain 
metaphysical image of the world: as being populated by unobservable entities. 
REFERENCE implies that (an essential part of) the subject matter of science is the 
unobservable world. By the same token, however, the metaphysical dimension of 
scientific realism is captured by not (much) more than the assertion that theoretical 
entities are real (viz., that theoretical terms genuinely refer). 
TRUTH takes realism beyond REFERENCE in asserting that t-entities (at least 
those referred to by t-terms featuring in true theories) are real: they populate the 
world. For both Boyd (1971; 1981) and (the 1970s) Putnam, TRUTH implies a certain 
understanding of truth, viz., truth as correspondence: to say that a theory is true is to 
say that it corresponds to reality. The chief motivation for such a conception of truth 
was explanationist. Putnam and Boyd insisted that truth (and reference) plays a key 
explanatory role: it explains the success of action (more particularly, the success of 
scientific theories and methodology, in the case of science).  
 That truth has an explanatory function in science is the key idea behind the ‘no 
miracles’ argument. To be sure, it is approximate truth that at best can be attributed to 
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scientific theories.3 But the logical point behind the ‘no miracles argument’ is that the 
success of scientific methodology is best explained by the fact that the theories that 
indispensably inform this methodology are relevantly true—that is true in the respects 
that inform the employment of these methodologies. Some philosophers (e.g., Ghins 
2001) have argued that it is not the truth of theory X that explains its empirical 
success, but the fact that entities and properties posited by X are real. True enough! 
Yet all that is required to move from reality to truth is semantic ascent.  
 TRUTH has notable metaphysical implications, viz., that scientific theories are 
answerable to the world and are made true by the world. The most congenial to 
realism way to develop this insight is by what I have come to call THE 
POSSIBILITY OF DIVERGENCE. The notion of correspondence is meant to capture 
the asymmetric dependence of the theories on the world. This asymmetry implies that 
though empirical success (even empirical adequacy) is a sign of truth, when truth is 
attributed to the theory, this is a substantive attribution which is meant to imply that 
the theory is made true by the world; which, in its turn, is taken to imply that it is 
logically possible that an accepted, successful and well-confirmed theory might be 
false simply because the world might not conform to it. This POSSIBILITY OF 
DIVERGENCE is meant to capture a modal fact of the world and in particular a sense 
in which the world is independent of theories, beliefs, warrants, epistemic practices 
etc. It requires a conception of truth which distances truth from certain epistemic 
notions (even idealized ones) such as being ideally warrantedly assertible. Hence, 
TRUTH implies that realism is committed to a non-epistemic conception of truth.4  
 Taken together REFERENCE and TRUTH imply a certain way to view the 
metaphysics of scientific realism. It’s not enough for realism to argue that certain 
theoretical entities posited by scientific theories are real. They and their properties 
should be (part of) the truth-makers of theoretical assertions and they should be mind-
independent (in the way suggested by THE POSSIBILITY OF DIVERGENCE). 
  CONTINUITY takes scientific realism beyond REFERENCE and TRUTH by 
capturing the all-important notion of convergence in theory-change. This kind of 
thesis is necessary for convergence, since it secures that successor theories might well 
talk about the very same entities that their abandoned predecessors did, even though 																																																								3	The	‘story’	of	approximate	truth	and	truthlikeness	(note:	these	are	distinct	concepts)	is	long	and	complex.	For	an	account	see	my	(1999,	chapter	11).	See	also	Niiniluoto	(1987)	and	Kuipers	(2000).	4	For	a	different	take	on	the	relation	between	theory	and	truth,	see	Devitt	(1984).	
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the now abandoned theories might have mischaracterized these entities. Putnam 
thought that the failure of CONTINUITY would lead to a disastrous “meta-
induction”:  
 
just as no term used in the science of more than fifty (or whatever) years ago referred, so it will 
turn out that no term used now (except may be observational terms, if there any such) refers 
(1978, 25).  
 
Then, REFERENCE and TRUTH go by the board too. 
 Putnam took it, correctly and insightfully I think, that this kind of pessimistic 
argument calls for a distinctively philosophical answer, viz. a theory of reference 
which allows for referential continuity on theory-change. So the key point is not that 
the premise of the inductive argument is false. Rather it is that this kind of argument 
relies on the implicit assumption that there is radical reference variance in theory 
change; that is that, a t-term that features in different theories necessarily refers to 
distinct unobservable entities. So Putnam’s diagnosis was that the historical challenge 
to realism he envisaged was a golden opportunity to articulate realism in a better way: 
realism should avoid some descriptivist and holistic theory of reference. For it is only 
on such a theory of reference that, as we have already noted in section 3, it becomes 
inevitable that that every time the theory changes, the meanings of all terms change, 
too; and given that reference is supposed to be fixed by descriptions, meaning change 
is taken to lead reference variance. It transpires then, that adopting a theory of 
reference, such as the causal theory, which allows for referential stability in theory-
change is indispensable for CONTINUITY and scientific realism.5 
  
6. Looking for a role for history 
6.1 The principle of no privilege 
Things did not turn out to be very easy for realism. If realism is an historical thesis, 
the history of science should be called in to support it or undermine it. In  
her (1976), Hesse advanced what she called “a principle of no privilege,” according to 
which  
 																																																								5	The	pure	causal	theory	of	reference	fails	for	various	reasons,	as	I	noted	in	my	(1999,	chapter	12).	There,	I	articulated	a	causal-descriptive	theory	of	reference	as	part	of	the	realist	toolbox.	For	more	on	this,	see	my	(2012).	
	 10	
our own scientific theories are held to be as much subject to radical conceptual change as past 
theories are seen to be.  
 
Hesse (1976: 266) put forward an argument that all theories are false.  
 
Every scientific system implies a conceptual classification of the world into an ontology of 
fundamental entities and properties - it is an attempt to answer the question “What is the world 
really made of?” But it is exactly these ontologies that are most subject to radical change 
throughout the history of science. Therefore in the spirit of the principle of no privilege, it seems 
that we must say either that all these ontologies are true, ie: we must give a realistic 
interpretation of all of them or we must say they are all false. But they cannot all be true in the 
same world, because they contain conflicting answers to the question ‘What is the world made 
of?’ Therefore they must all be false.  
 
This argument, it should be clear, implies a substantial role for history of science. 
For unless there is a recognizable pattern of change in the ‘ontology of fundamental 
entities and properties’, it can always be argued that our current scientific theories are 
not subject to radical change. The rationale for the Principle of No Privilege is 
predominantly historical and hence its defense should be historical. As Hesse 
admitted, the Principle arises “from accepting the induction from the history of 
science” (1976: 271). 
But this is precisely the problem with this Principle: it should be borne out by the 
history of theory-change in science that all these ‘ontologies’ have been incompatible 
with each other; hence they cannot all be true. Showing incompatibility presupposes a 
theory of reference of t-terms which does not allow that same or different terms 
featuring in different theories can nonetheless refer to the same entity in the world. 
And this is precisely the position already challenged by Putnam: it is simply question-
begging to adopt a theory of reference which makes it inevitable that there is radical-
reference variance in theory-change.6   
																																																								6	Hesse,	like	almost	everyone	else	at	that	time,	made	a	connection	between	reference	and	ontology	in	that	the	ontological	commitments	of	the	theory	are	reflected	in	the	(putative)	reference	of	its	theoretical	terms.	Hence,	whether	or	not	there	is	continuity	in	ontology	among	successive	theories	was	taken	to	be	the	same	as	the	existence	or	not	of	referential	continuity.	In	her	argument,	Hesse	relied	precisely	on	the	possibility,	“emphasized	by	revolutionaries,”	that,	as	she	put	it	“all	our	theoretical	terms	will,	in	the	natural	course	of	scientific	development,	share	the	demise	of	phlogiston”	(1976:	271).	
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To be sure, Hesse, like almost anyone else in this debate, shares the intuition that 
falsity cannot genuinely explain the successes of science. Hence she goes on to argue 
that there is some continuity in theory-change which is not restricted to the 
“accumulation of true observation sentences,” but includes  
 
some theoretical sentences which are carried over fairly directly from a past theoretical 
framework to our own, that is, which do not depend for their truth on the existence and 
classification of particular hypothetical entities, but are nearer to pragmatic predictive test.  
 
Interestingly, these statements include that “water is composed of discrete 
molecules of hydrogen and oxygen in definite proportions.” This, she says, “is true, 
though we are not able to specify in ultimate terms what exactly molecules and atoms 
of water, hydrogen, and oxygen are (Newtonian, Daltonian, quantum, and relativistic 
field theories tell different stories about them).” 
The issue then is this. Is there a sense in which “the revolutionary induction from 
the history of science about theory change” (Hesse 1976: 268) can be blocked by 
admitting that the continuity in theory change is substantial? Differently put, Hesse’s 
argument says nothing about false theories being such that some of them are truer (in 
their theoretical assertions) than others. And this is precisely the option realists came 
to exploit.  
 
6.2 Getting nearer to the truth 
William Newton-Smith (1981) was perhaps the first to think that the history of 
science (better: the past track-record of science) could be used in defence of realism. 
He took realism to be committed to two theses 
 
(1) theories are true or false in virtue of how the world is, and  
(2) the point of the scientific enterprise is to discover explanatory truths about the 
world. 
 
He then noted that (2) is under threat “if we reflect on the fact that all physical 
theories in the past have had their heyday and have eventually been rejected as false.”  
And he added (ibid): 
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Indeed, there is inductive support for a pessimistic induction:  any theory will be discovered to 
be false within, say 200 years of being propounded. We may think of some of our current 
theories as being true. But modesty requires us to assume that they are not so. For what is so 
special about the present? We have good inductive grounds for concluding that current 
theories—even our most favorite ones—will come to be seen to be false. Indeed the evidence 
might even be held to support the conclusion that no theory that will ever be discovered by the 
human race is strictly speaking true. So how can it be rational to pursue that which we have 
evidence for thinking can never be reached? 
 
It should be obvious that part of the argument that Newton-Smith aimed to neutralize 
is Hesse’s Principle of No Privilege, cast as a question: “what is so special about the 
present?” His reply to this argument was that realists should posit “an interim goal for 
the scientific enterprise. This is the goal of getting nearer the truth.” If this is the goal, 
Newton-Smith argued, there is no reason to bother with the preceding induction: “its 
sting is removed.” Accepting the pessimistic induction “is compatible with 
maintaining that current theories, while strictly speaking false, are getting nearer the 
truth.” 
But the role of the history of science in the defense of realism was suitably 
restricted to motivating what Newton-Smith called ‘the animal farm move’, viz., that 
though all theories are false, some are truer than others. He took it that what was 
needed to be defended was the thesis that if a theory T2 has greater verisimilitude than 
a theory T1, T2 is likely to have greater observational success than T1. And he 
advanced what he called a transcendental strategy in its defense, which, for all 
practical purposes I think, is a ‘best explanation’ strategy. The key argument was that 
there is an “undeniable fact” to be reckoned with, viz., that “in a mature science like 
physics, contemporary theories provided us with better predictions about the world 
than their predecessors and have placed us in a better position to manipulate that 
world.” The reckoning came with the claim that if the ‘greater verisimilitude’ thesis is 
correct (that is, if theories “are increasing in truth-content without increasing in 
falsity-content”), then the increase in predictive power would be explained and be 
rendered expectable.  This increase in predictive power “would be totally mystifying 
(…) if it were not for the fact that theories are capturing more and more truth about 
the world.” 
This kind of argument, plausible though it may be, dismisses the force of the 
pessimistic induction all too quickly. Not because Newton-Smith is wrong about the 
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need to focus on near or approximate truth rather than on (full and exact) truth. But 
because the pessimistic induction, if forceful at all, undercuts the explanatory link 
between success and approximate truth. Hence the realists needed to do some more 
work to restore this link. 
 
6.3 A confutation of convergent realism 
That more work was needed became obvious after the publication of Laudan’s (1981). 
His history-based argument against realism was precisely meant to show how the link 
between success and truth is undermined by taking into account the history of science. 
Laudan formulated his argument via reference—a point alluded to in Putnam’s 
formulation of realism. But he did aim to block the claim that there is an explanatory 
connection between (approximate) truth and success—a point raised by Newton-
Smith’s argument. 
Laudan started with granting, “for the sake of argument” that if a theory is 
approximately true, then it will be successful. He then aimed to show that even if we 
granted this, “explanatory success” cannot be taken “as a rational warrant for a 
judgment of approximate truth.” So his aim was to show that the realist thesis is not 
rationally warranted. 
What is the structure of Laudan’s argument? There is some controversy concerning 
this issue, but the thought has been that if we are to take seriously Laudan’s 
“plethora” of theories that were “both successful and (so far as we can judge) non-
referential with respect to many of their central explanatory concepts”, then the 
argument is inductive. In particular: 
 
(I) 
There is a plethora of theories (ratio 6 to 1)7 which were successful and yet not 
approximately true.  
Therefore, it is highly probable that current theories will not be approximately true 
(despite their success).  
 
																																																								7	Laudan	(1981:	35)	noted	the	famous	6	to	1	ratio:	“I	daresay	that	for	every	highly	successful	theory	in	the	past	of	science	which	we	now	believe	to	be	a	genuinely	referring	theory,	one	could	find	half	a	dozen	once	successful	theories	which	we	now	regard	as	substantially	non-referring.”	
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Yet, this kind of argument has obvious flaws. Two are the most important, I think. 
The first is that the basis for induction is hard to assess. This does not just concern the 
6:1 ratio—where does it come from? It also concerns the issue of how we individuate 
and count theories as well as how we judge success and referential failure. Unless we 
are clear on all these issues in advance of the inductive argument, we cannot even 
start putting together the inductive evidence for its conclusion.  
The second flaw of (I) is that the conclusion is too strong. It does not just undercut 
the connection between success and approximate truth; it yields as a conclusion that it 
is more likely than not that current successful theories are not approximately true. 
Hence it makes it the case that there is rational warrant for the judgment that current 
theories are not approximately true. The flaw with this kind a of sweeping 
generalisation is precisely that it disregards totally the strong evidence there is for 
current theories—it renders it totally irrelevant to the issue of their likelihood of being 
true. Surely this is unwarranted. Not only because it disregards potentially important 
differences in the quality and quantity of evidence there is for current theories 
(differences that would justify treating current theories as more supported by available 
evidence than past theories were by the then available evidence); but also because it 
makes a mockery of looking for evidence for scientific theories! If I know that X is 
more likely than Y and that this relation cannot change by doing Z, there is no point 
in doing Z.  
If the “plethora” of theories cannot warrant an inductive conclusion, what is its role 
in Laudan’s argument? Note the stated aim of the argument, viz., to show 
“explanatory success” cannot be taken “as a rational warrant for a judgment of 
approximate truth”. 
For X to be a rational warrant for Y, X must offer good reasons to accept Y. Past 
experience of X being correlated with Y is a good reason to accept a future correlation 
(for non inductive skeptics, anyway). And conversely, if X and Y have not been 
correlated in the past, we are not warranted in expecting that they will be correlated 
currently or in the future. Note that this kind of reasoning does not render it false that 
X may go with Y currently or in the future. It just undermines the warrant for this 
kind of judgment or expectation. An alternative way to see the issue is this. Y is 
supposed to explain X (approximate truth is supposed to explain success). But if X 
and Y have not been correlated in the past, (if X has not been associated with Y, or if 
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(more strongly) X has been associated with not-Y), then the warrant for accepting Y 
as the (best) explanation of X is undercut.  
 
6.4 The divide et impera strategy 
If we think of Laudan’s argument as a warrant-remover argument and if we also 
think that the fate of (past) theories should have a bearing on what we are warranted 
in accepting now, we should think differently. In my (1996; 1999 chapter 5) I argued 
that we should think of Laudan’s argument as a kind of reductio. And by this, 
(somewhat confusingly I must now admit), I meant to imply that it is not a proper 
reductio. As I noted, Laudan’s argument aimed to “discredit the claim that there is an 
explanatory connection between empirical success and truth-likeness” which would 
warrant the realist view that current successful theories are approximately true. If we 
view the argument this way, as a potential warrant-remover argument, then the past 
record of science does play a role in it, since it is meant to offer this warrant-remover. 
But Laudan was careful to be using the qualifier “so far as we can judge” repeatedly. 
Past theories are non-referential “so far as we can judge,” that is by our own lights. 
This implied that past theories were false, “so far as we can judge.” This means that if 
we accept current theories to be true, then “so far as we can judge” past theories 
cannot be true. All this is consistent with leaving it open that current theories are true 
or false. It just requires that it cannot be the case that both past theories and current 
ones are true.  
So my (1996) reconstruction of Laudan’s argument was as follows: 
 
(P) 
(A) Currently successful theories are approximately true. 
(B) If currently successful theories are truth-like, then past theories cannot have 
been. 
(C) These characteristically false theories were, nonetheless, empirically 
successful. (the ‘historical gambit’) 
Hence, empirical success is not connected with truth-likeness and truth-likeness 
cannot explain success: the realist’s potential warrant for (A) is defeated. 
 
(B) is critical for the argument. It is meant to capture discontinuity in theory-change, 
which I put it thus (stated in the material mode): “Past theories are deemed not to 
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have been truth-like because the entities they posited are no longer believed to exist 
and/or because the laws and mechanisms they postulated are not part of our current 
theoretical description of the world.” 
In this setting, Laudan’s ‘historical gambit’ (C) makes perfect sense. For unless 
there are past successful theories which are warrantedly deemed not to be truth-like 
“so far as we can judge,” the previous premise cannot be sustained and the warrant-
removing reductio fails. If premise (C) can be substantiated, success cannot be used to 
warrant the claim that current theories are true. And there is no way that this premise 
can be substantiated apart from looking at past successful theories and their fate. 
History of science is thereby essentially engaged.  
I still think this is the best way to make sense of the challenge Laudan had in mind 
in a way that a) the fate of past theories is seriously taken into account and b) the 
argument is seen as warrant-removing. To respond then to this argument, realists 
needed to be selective in their commitments. This response has come to be known as 
the divide et impera strategy to refute Laudan’s argument (see my 1996). The focus of 
this strategy was on rebutting the claim that the truth of current theories implies that 
past theories cannot be deemed truth-like.  
 Philip Kitcher (1993) and myself (1996; 1999) have argued that there are ways to 
distinguish between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ parts of past abandoned theories and to 
show that the ‘good’ parts—those that enjoyed evidential support, were not idle 
components and the like—were retained in subsequent theories. This kind of response 
suggests that there has been enough theoretical continuity in theory-change to warrant 
the realist claim that science is ‘on the right track’. To be more precise, the realist 
strategy proceeds in two steps. The first is to make the claim of continuity (or 
convergence) plausible, viz., to show that there is continuity in theory-change and that 
this is not merely empirical continuity: substantive theoretical claims that featured in 
past theories and played a key role in their successes (especially novel predictions) 
have been incorporated in subsequent theories and continue to play an important role 
in making them empirically successful. But this first step does not establish that the 
convergence is to the truth. For this claim to be made plausible a second argument is 
needed, viz., that the emergence of this evolving-but-convergent network of 
theoretical assertions is best explained by the assumption that it is, by and large, 
	 17	
approximately true.8 
 
7. Structural Realism 
The selective realist trend started with the position that John Worrall (1989) dubbed 
‘structural realism’. This was an attempt to capitalize on the fact that despite the 
radical changes at the theoretical level, successor theories have tended to retain the 
mathematical structure of their predecessors. Worrall’s thought was that theories can 
successfully represent the structure of the world, although they tend to be wrong in 
their claims about the entities they posit. As Worrall put it: the structural realist 
“insists that it is a mistake to think that we can ever ‘understand’ the nature of the 
basic furniture of the universe” (1989: 122). Then, in opposition to scientific realism, 
structural realism restricts the cognitive content of scientific theories to their 
mathematical structure together with their empirical consequences. But, in opposition 
to instrumentalism, structural realism suggests that the mathematical structure of a 
theory represents the structure of the world (real relations between things).  
 Unsurprisingly, the chief argument for structural realism is a (weak) version of the 
‘no miracles’ argument. The key idea is that though successful novel predictions 
suggest that the theory has latched onto the world, it is only the structure of the world 
(as this is expressed by the mathematical structure of the theory) that the theory 
latches onto. Against the pessimistic induction, structural realism contends that there 
is continuity in theory-change, but this continuity is (again) at the level of 
mathematical structure. Hence, the ‘carried over’ mathematical structure of the theory 
correctly represents the structure of the world and this best explains the predictive 
success of a theory. 
 Now, if this kind of argument is to lend any credence to structural realism, it must 
be the case that the mathematical structure of a theory is somehow exclusively 
responsible for the predictive success of the theory. But, as I have argued in detail in 
my (1995), it is not true that the mathematical equations alone—devoid of their 
physical content—can give rise to any predictions. 
If structural realism is to employ a version (no matter how weak) of the no-
miracles argument in order to claim that retained mathematical equations reveal real 
relations in the world, it should also admit that some physical content—not 																																																								8	The	divide	et	impera	strategy	has	generated	considerable	discussion.	For	some	recent	takes	on	it	see	Cordero	(2011)	and	Vickers	(2013).	
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necessarily empirical and low-level—is also retained. But such an admission would 
undercut the claim that the predictive success vindicates only the mathematical 
structure of a theory; by the same token, it would undercut the epistemic dichotomy 
between the structure and the content of a physical theory. 
 Structural realism was independently developed in the 1970s by Grover Maxwell 
(1970; 1970a) in an attempt to show that the Ramsey-sentence approach to theories 
need not lead to instrumentalism. He called ‘Structural realism’ the view that: i) 
scientific theories issue in existential commitments to unobservable entities and ii) all 
non-observational knowledge of unobservables is structural knowledge, i.e., 
knowledge not of their first-order (or intrinsic) properties, but rather of their higher-
order (or structural) properties. The key idea here was that a Ramsey-sentence 
satisfies both conditions (i) and (ii). So we might say that, if true, the Ramsey-
sentence RT gives us knowledge of the structure of the world: there is a certain 
structure which satisfies the Ramsey-sentence and the structure of the world (or of the 
relevant worldly domain) is isomorphic to this structure. It should be noted that 
Maxwell’s point against Carnap was that the Ramsey-sentence approach to theories 
was amenable to a realist construal more than to an instrumentalist one.  
 Though initially Worrall’s version of structural realism was different from 
Maxwell’s, being focused on—and motivated by—Henri Poincaré’s argument for 
structural continuity in theory-change9, in later work Worrall came to adopt the 
Ramsey-sentence version of structural realism (see appendix IV of Zahar 2001). So 
what I (2006) have called Maxwellian-Worrallian structural realism asserts that the 
world has excess structure over the appearances, but this excess structure can be 
captured (hypothetico-deductively) by the Ramsey-sentence of an empirically 
adequate theory.  
Recall from section 3, that Carnap’s insight in the 1950s was that a scientific 
theory T is logically equivalent to the following conjunction: RT & (RT àT), where 
the Ramsey-sentence captures the factual content of the theory, and the conditional RT 
àT captures its analytic content (it is a meaning postulate). Precisely because the so-
called Carnap-sentence is analytic, Carnap thought that characterizing the excess 
content of a theory over its Ramsey-sentence as talking about certain unobservable 
entities (e.g., electrons) or as talking indifferently about whatever satisfied the theory 																																																								9	For	a	detailed	analysis	of	Poincaré’s	structural	realism	in	relation	to	his	conventionalism,	see	my		(2014).	
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(even if these were taken to be numbers and sets thereof) was a matter of linguistic 
choice. But for a realist this cannot be a matter of choice of language. In any case, it 
turns out that if the Ramsey-sentence RT is true, the theory T must be true: it cannot 
fail to be true. Is there a sense in which RT can be false? A Ramsey-sentence may be 
empirically inadequate. Then it is false. But if it is empirically adequate (if, that is, the 
structure of observable phenomena is embedded in one of its models), then it is bound 
to be true. For, as Max Newman (1928) first noted in relation to Russell’s 
structuralism, given some cardinality constraints, it is guaranteed that there is an 
interpretation of the variables of RT in the theory’s intended domain.10  
Though Carnap felt at home with this result since empiricism could thus 
accommodate the claim that theories are true, without going much beyond empirical 
adequacy, reducing truth to empirical adequacy is a problem for those who want to be 
realists, even if just about structure. For, it is no longer clear what has been left for 
someone to be realist about. 
This is a pretty damaging objection to structural realism. The only way out is for 
structural realism to abandon pure structuralism and to treat structure as being defined 
by real or natural relations. Having first specified these natural relations, one may 
abstract away their content and study their structure. But if one begins with the 
structure, then one is in no position to tell which relations one studies and whether 
they are natural or not.11 
 
8. Concluding thoughts 
Four decades after the ‘no miracles argument’ and the ‘pessimistic induction’, where 
does the realism debate stand? It seems fair to say that a key realist claim, viz., that 
science does offer knowledge of the unobservable part of nature, has been vindicated. 
Currently, all sides of the debate—with the exception of constructive empiricism—
admit that science does offer epistemic access to some unobservable parts of reality. 
Hence, the unobservable is not, ipso facto, epistemically inaccessible. Old 
empiricism-motivated claims that scientific knowledge is restricted to whatever is 
																																																								10	For	more	on	this	see	my	(1999;	2001	&	2006).	See	also	Demopoulos	(2003).	11	For	more	on	this	see	Psillos	(2009);	Ainsworth	(2009);	Cruse	(2005);	Cruse	&	Papineau	(2002).	Partly	because	of	the	failures	of	the	standard	(so-called	‘epistemic’)	version	of	structural	realism	and	partly	because	of	independent	reasons,	an	‘ontic’	version	of	structuralism	has	acquired	currency.	I	won’t	go	into	the	debates	around	ontic	structural	realism.	For	an	overview	and	recent	developments	see	Ladyman	&	Ross	(2007);	French	(2014)	and	Psillos	(2009;	2016a).	
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given in immediate experience and observation hold no weight any more.12  
By the same token, however, the rivalry to scientific realism has now shifted to the 
general point that there is a sharp epistemic division to be drawn within the 
unobservable; that is, between those aspects of the unobservable that are epistemically 
accessible and those that are not. Structural realists, for instance, draw the division 
between the knowable (unobservable) structure of nature and whatever is left to ‘fill 
in’ the structure—objects, entities, natures and the like. Contextual instrumentalists 
(Stanford 2006) draw the division between those entities to which there is an 
independent route of epistemic access (mediated by theories that cannot be subjected 
to serious doubt) and those entities to which all supposed epistemic access is mediated 
by high-level theories. The former are epistemically accessible, while the latter are 
said to be impenetrable. Semi-realists (cf. Chakravartty 2007) draw the division 
between detection properties and auxiliary properties of particulars; and so on.  
The common denominator of all these dichotomous positions is this: there 
is a principled limit to the scientific knowledge of the world. (The limit is different in 
different positions, but it is always principled and definite). The realist victory is that 
this division is within the realm of the unobservable. But the realist defeat is that some 
aspect of the unobservable is, for principled reasons, inaccessible. 
 In my own work I have tried to argue that there is no good reason (either a priori or 
a posteriori) to think that there is a principled epistemic division between what can be 
known of nature and what cannot. There might be parts of nature that science might 
never be able to map out, but these do not fall nicely within a conceptual category 
which captures one side of a sharp epistemic dichotomy (the unknown X: the 
noumena; the non-structure; the intrinsic properties; the auxiliary properties; 
whatever-there-is-only-thin-epistemic access-to; whatever-there-is-only-theory-
mediated-access-to; and the like).  
Though the epistemic debate still goes on, the focus of attention has been shifting 
from epistemology towards metaphysics and ontology. The key question seems to be 
the following: if we take science seriously and if we take scientific theories as true, or 
approximately true, are we thereby committed to a certain way to understand the deep 
structure of the world? Are we committed to substantive accounts of causation, laws, 
necessity, properties and other key metaphysical categories? Or are deflationary 																																																								12	It	must	be	stressed,	however,	that	logical	empiricists	defended	some	anti-metaphysical	version	of	scientific	realism—see	my	(2011).	
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accounts good enough? As I have put it in my (2013), the key contrast is between a 
neo-Aristotelian scientific realism and a neo-Humean one. I have personally sided 
with the neo-Humeans, but currently lots of interesting work is done on this front. The 
current enthusiasm for structuralism is a case in point. 
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